RECENT CASES
which impose a tax to the extent that assets are freed from all offsetting obligations.
Besides, there is a special difficulty in the principal case since it allows deduction of a
loss through decline in value before sale of the depreciated asset. Although from the
standpoint of good policy taxation of debt reductions may be questionable,- once it
is accepted, there is no justification for the exception created by the principal case.
Trade Regulation-Robinson-Patman Act-Granting of Brokerage Allowaces[Federal].-The petitioner, an interstate retail chain-grocery, maintained a subsidiary
field-buying agency to contact sellers and supply market information. The agents received a fixed salary from the petitioner and, in addition, brokerage allowances from
sellers in the form of net price concessions to the petitioner. The Federal Trade Commission issued a cease and desist order in accordance with Section 2(c) of the RobinsonPatman Act, which forbids the granting of brokerage to buyers or their agents except
for services actually rendered. On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, held, the petitioner's activities constituted a violation of Section 2(c). The
order of the commission was affirmed. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Federal
Trade Conmissin.2

An analysis of the instant decision can only be made in the light of the purpose of
the Robinson-Patman Act. Congress desired, by amendment to the Clayton Act,
more effectively to prevent price discrimination and interference with freedom of cornpetition.3 Section 2(c) in particular was designed to preclude large buyers from receiving secret discounts not granted to other buyers.4 Congressional hearings had disclosed
that A. & P. and other large chain-stores, by ostensibly rendering brokerage services,
were in effect gaining net price concessions which enabled them to undersell competi1 One objection to taxation of debt reductions is that it levies an income tax on those
least
able to pay since reductions are often made in return for cash settlements given by debtors
near insolvency. In the recent Chandler Act Amendment to the Bankruptcy Act, Congress
seems convinced of the undesirability of the present law which often levies an "income tax"
on an insolvent debtor, Income Tax Provisions of the Chandler Act, 6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 447,
451 (1938); Taxability of Gains Resulting from Reduction of Liabilities, 44 Yale L. J. r44
(1934).
x "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce,
to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other
compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other party
to such transaction or to an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where such
intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of
any party to such transaction other than the person by whom such compensation is so granted
or paid," 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), r5 U.S.C.A. § i3(c) (Supp. 1938).
2 io6 F. (2d) 667 (C.C.A. 3d 1939).
3 H.R. Rep. 2287, 74 th Cong. 2d Sess. (1936); S. Rep. 1502, 74 th Cong. 2d Sess. (1936). For
a general discussion of the Robinson-Patman Act, see Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act
(1938); Sharp, Discrimination and the Robinson-Patman Act, 5 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 383 (1938);
Zorn and Feldman, Business under the New Price Laws (1937); The Legality of Discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act, 36 Col. L. Rev. 1285 (1936); The Robinson-Patman
Act: Some Prospective Problems of Construction and Constitutionality, 5o Harv. L. Rev. io6
(1936).
4 H.R.

Rep. 2951,

7 4 th

Cong. 2d Sess., at 7 (1936).
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tors.s Brokerage allowances were deemed desirable only if services were rendered by
independent brokers for sellers or buyers alone, and if the commissions received from
6
sellers were not passed on to buyers.
In accord with this purpose, the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Fourth Circuits ruled in Biddle PurchasingCo. v. Federal Trade Commission1 and Oliver Bros. v.
FederalTrade Commission,8 that a buyer's payment to an independent broker of a fixed
service charge in exchange for all brokerage allowances was a violation of Section 2(c).
The facts in the instant case would seem to present an even stronger need for injunction, for the brokers involved were not independent contractors, but employees of the
buyer. The court refused to accept the petitioner's argument that the exception permitted by the act with respect to services rendered sanctioned brokerage allowances
in this case. The buying agency, said the court, was employed by the petitioner; it
could not be employed by two masters at once. It is doubtful, however, that a broker
9
can never represent the interests of both buyer and seller at the same time. The forethat
to
indicate
Act
seems
going discussion as to the purpose of the Robinson-Patman
such a practice would be unobjectionable if the broker retained all fees received from
the seller. Receipt by the buyer of a rebate which would enable him to undersell his
competitor remains the test of a violation of Section 2(c). Whether such rebate is received directly or indirectly, seems immaterial.
The instant case is thus undoubtedly within the purview of Section 2(C). It must
next be considered whether such inclusion raises constitutional difficulties. The court,
following the Biddle and Oliver cases, refused to construe Section 2(c) in the light of
Section 2(a) which forbids price discrimination only if its effect "may be substantially
°
to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce"1 Section 2(c), it was felt, dealt with a specific trade practice so unreasonably discriminatory
and obviously monopolistic that its injurious effect upon commerce is to be assumed.
A question arises, however, whether such an enactment constitutes a denial of the
liberty of contract guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Governmental protection
against infringement of the rights of the group must not result in complete sacrifice of
s See especially S. Hearings on S.4171, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. (1936) and H. R. Hearings on
H.R. 8442, 74th Cong. ist Sess. (1935).
6H.R. Rep., op. cit. supra note 4.
7 96 F. (2d) 687 (C.C.A. 2d 1938), cert. den. 305 U.S. 634 (1938).
8 102 F. (2d) 763 (C.C.A. 4 th i939).
9That Congress intended no such broad prohibition might be implied from Section 4 of the
Robinson-Patman Act which provides that "nothing in this act shall prevent a cooperative association from returning to its members, producers, or consumers, the whole or any part of the
net earnings or surplus resulting from its trading operations, in proportion to their purchases
or sales from, to, or through the association," 40 Stat. 1528 (1936), is U.S.C.A. § 13(b) (Supp.
1938). It has been suggested that in view of this section the receipt of brokerage fees by voluntary co-operative associations from sellers may not be a violation of Section 2(c), since such
associations are known to render valuable brokerage services to sellers. See H.R. Rep. 2951,
74th Cong. 2d Sess., at 9 (x936). See also Zorn and Feldman, op. cit. supra note 3, at 213; Col.
L. Rev., op. cit. supra note 3, at 313. For a general discussion of the "services rendered"

clause, see The Brokerage Provision in the Robinson-Patman Act, 34 Ill. L. Rev. 319, 326
(1939).

1049 Stat. 1526 (1936), is U.S.C.A. § 13(a) (Supp. 1938).
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the rights of the individual; both are important. Thus, not all practices monopolistic
in the traditional economic sense are deemed an improper exercise of individual liberty. Since a perfectly competitive system, one in which the effect upon the market of
the action of any one entrepreneur is negligible, can exist only in an imaginative sphere,
and since great hardship would be occasioned by any attempt to approximate such a
system, gains in individual initiative and efficiency due to the keener bargaining power
of certain groups often justify slight losses in competition." Some such analysis underlies the "rule of reason" doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Despite its broad language, the Sherman Act has been held to prohibit only those combinations constituting an unreasonable restraint of trade."2 Similarly Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, although it more closely approximates the narrowness of Section 2(c) of
the Robinson-Patman Act, may have been modified by an application of the "rule of
reason." Section 7 prohibits stock acquisition if the effect might be either to lessen substantially competition "between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the
corporation making the acquisition," or to "tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce";13 but it has been construed to mean that not all monopolies are within the
act; the lessening of competition is not illegal unless it has a substantial effect on the
entire industry.'4 Nor have rigid prohibitions of price discrimination received different
treatment. A state statute prohibiting all price discriminations not based on differential transportation costs was held to be a violation of the liberty to contract guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment.'s
Strict adherence to precedent, therefore, would seem to demand application of the
"rule of reason" to the Robinson-Patman Act as a whole and to Section 2(a) in particular. Section 2(c) might escape such application despite its rigid prohibition on the
ground that since it deals only with payments, the discretionary control of the court
based upon the construction of the words "restraint" and "discrimination" does not
there operate.,6 The Supreme Court's decision as to the scope and constitutionality of
Section 2(c) might be influenced by a realization of the tremendous administrative difficulties involved in the enforcement of an all-inclusive provision.7 If the section is
otherwise constitutional, however, the court should not concern itself with problems of
administration and enforcement.
The court in the principal case assumed no violation of due process and based its
decision on the plenary power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. A ques1,For discussion of the economics involved, see Clark, Studies in the Economics of Overhead Cost 416-33 (1923).

2Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States,
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'338 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (1927).
'4

Temple Anthracite Coal Co. v. FTC,5, F. (2d) 656 (C.C.A. 3d 1931); cf. Int'l Shoe Co. v.

FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (x930).

ISFairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. i (1927); cf. Central Lumber Co. v.
South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157 (1912). See McLaughlin, The Courts and the Robinson-Patman
Act: Possibilities of Strict Construction, 4 Law & Contemp. Probs. 410 (1937); Clark, op. cit.
supra note xi, at 433.
x6McLaughlin,
'7

op. cit. supra note 15, at 416.

See Sharp, op. cit. supra note 3, at 387.
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tion thus arises whether the negotiation of a sales contract within a state is part of the
subsequent movement of goods across state lines or a purely intrastate transaction.
The petitioner's field-buying agents carried on purchasing operations all over the country, and the goods so obtained were shipped to warehouses in widespread geographical
areas. An examination of these activities reveals that they comprised not only the obtaining of goods, but also the distribution of such goods in interstate commerce. Previous cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States have held that the sale
of tangibles for transportation out of state is part of interstate commerce.'" The court
has also held that if drummers solicit orders in one state for sellers or manufacturers
in another, the solicitation is not subject to state regulation.19 One case has held that
brokers engaged in general business within a state are subject to a state license tax
even though their transactions at times involved the shipping of goods across state
lines; the court pointed out, however, that its decision did not sanction the imposition
of the state tax on a broker transacting business solely for non-resident merchants.-0
Subsequent cases have held invalid state laws attempting to tax the gross incomes
obtained from both interstate and intrastate marketing or soliciting operations." Since
the goods in the instant case were intended almost entirely for out-of-state shipment,
there seems little doubt that the brokerage activities involved in their purchase were
a part of interstate commerce. The fact that the petitioner's retail sales may be
purely intrastate seems immaterial, for the alleged unlawful brokerage practices arose
only in connection with purchasing activities.
The instant situation would seem a proper subject for congressional regulation under the commerce power even if the contracts of purchase are deemed separable from
subsequent out-of-state shipments. Recent cases arising under the Wagner Act have
pointed out that a business need not consist solely of interstate activities to be subject
to regulation under the commerce power; it is enough that the object of the regulation
substantially affects interstate commerce. 2 The application of these broad principles
to the instant case seems clear, for certainly brokerage operations directly and substantially affect the amount of goods subsequently shipped across state lines.
18Int'l Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 9r (igio); Flanagan v. Federal Coal Co., 267 U.S.
222 (1925).
Robbins v. Taxing District of South Carolina, 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
v. Taxing District of Shelby County, '45 U.S. i (i89i).
21Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U.S. 325 (1925); Givin, Vhite &Prince v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1938).
22This proposition was first dearly enunciated in NLRB v. Jones &Laughlin Steel Co., 3o
U.S. i (1937), in which the Supreme Court held that even intrastate activities such as local
labor disputes may have such a substantial effect upon interstate commerce that their control
is a proper exercise of the commerce power; cf. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303
U.S. 453 (1938) (37 per cent of cannery's products were shipped out of state); NLRB v. A. S.
Abell Co., 97 F. (2d) 951 (C.C.A. 4th 1938) (i6.85 per cent of newspaper's circulation was out
of state). The Supreme Court held in Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. i97 (1938),
that labor disputes in a utility company supplying a purely local market were subject to congressional regulation since the interruption of the supply of electric power because of such dispute would vitally affect enterprises engaged in interstate commerce.
'9
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